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Abstract Internal armed conflicts have become increasingly self-financing in the
last decades, with valuable natural resources figuring among the primary sources of
conflict funding. In order to end these armed conflicts, the international community
has developed several instruments targeting their funding, most notably by curbing
the illegal trade in natural resources. This article examines two of these instruments,
i.e. the Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds (KPCS) and the
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (OECD Guidance). More in particular, it
analyses the mechanisms established by these instruments to stop the trade in
conflict resources and the extent to which these contribute to improving the gov-
ernance of natural resources as a tool for the prevention of new conflicts. This article
argues that even though the KPCS and the OECD Guidance do not impose legally
binding obligations upon their participants, there are possibilities to enforce these
instruments. In order to gain a better understanding of their enforceability, this
article argues that it is important to assess these instruments as part of the broader
political and legal framework in which they operate. In addition, this article argues
that these instruments, notwithstanding their non-binding character do have rele-
vance for the formation of international law in relation to the governance of natural
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resources. Both instruments play an important role in setting standards for this
purpose and, in this way, reflect a growing consensus on how natural resources
should be managed.
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1 Introduction
Natural resources, including diamonds, gold and precious metals, play a key role in
financing some of today’s most violent armed conflicts, including those that are
currently fought in the DR Congo and the Central African Republic. In the DR
Congo, armed groups have taken over control over important mining sites in the east
of the country, permitting them to obtain a source of conflict funding from the
exploitation of gold and precious minerals. In the Central African Republic, armed
groups have gained control over the diamond production in parts of the country,
notably in the east, after conflict broke out in December 2012.1 In both situations, an
active UN peacekeeping force has been mandated to help reinstate State authority
over the whole territory.2
These are just a few of the most recent examples of natural resources financing
armed conflicts. Although not a new phenomenon, recent decades show an increase
in this type of conflict financing. Since the end of Cold War rivalry, external
sponsoring of armed groups fighting in internal armed conflicts has largely dried up.
As a result, armed groups have increasingly turned to natural resources as an
alternative source of conflict funding.3 Since the trade in valuable natural resources
provides these armed groups an independent source of income to finance their
activities, stopping the trade in natural resources that finance armed conflicts is
therefore essential to ending these conflicts.
This has been recognized by the UN Security Council in its resolutions and
Presidential statements. The UN Security Council has adopted several sanctions
regimes targeting specific commodities on a case-by-case basis. Examples include
the diamond sanctions imposed against Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia. In other
instances, the Council refrained from imposing commodity sanctions proper, but,
1 For the CAR, see the KP administrative decision on Vigilance of 18 March 2013, which identifies areas
taken over by armed groups.
2 For the DR Congo, see UN Security Council Res. 1925 (2010), 2053 (2012) and 2147 (2014) for the
deployment and mandate of MONUSCO. For the CAR, see UN Security Council Res. 2127 (2013) for the
deployment and mandate of the MISCA (led by the African Union) and Res. 2149 (2014) for MINUSCA
(a UN integrated mission). It is interesting to note that MONUSCO has been explicitly mandated to assist
the government of the DR Congo in reform of its minerals sector in order to enhance the traceability of
these minerals.
3 Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005), Ballentine and Sherman (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2005),
pp. 625–633, Le Billon (2012).
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instead, targeted individuals and companies involved in the trade in conflict
resources, i.e. natural resources traded by armed groups to fund their activities. An
example concerns the sanctions imposed against individuals and companies
providing support to armed groups in the DR Congo.
The success of trade-related sanctions depends however on effective control
mechanisms and cooperation between States and companies in implementing the
sanctions. This article reviews some of the principal instruments which have been
set up in recent years to address the trade in conflict resources. More in specific, it
discusses the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) for Rough Diamonds
(KPCS) and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of
Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (OECD Guidance).
The objective of the article is twofold. Firstly, it aims to determine the
contribution of the KPCS and the OECD Guidance to stopping the trade in conflict
resources. For this part of the analysis, the article identifies the mechanisms
established by the KPCS and the OECD Guidance and the position of these
instruments in the broader institutional framework. It relies principally on the
constitutive documents of these instruments as well as on decisions by international
organisations and national authorities, including case law and national legislation.
The approach to assessing the contribution of the KPCS and the OECD Guidance to
stopping the trade in conflict resources is therefore primarily institutional. The
reason for adopting such an institutional approach is related to a broader ambition to
examine how the KPCS and the OECD Guidance—as non-binding instruments—
obtain binding force within a broader normative framework, which, arguably,
ultimately enhances their effectiveness.
The second objective of this article is to assess the contribution of the KPCS and
the OECD Guidance to improving the governance of natural resources in conflict-
torn states. In many states where natural resources have financed armed conflicts,
the internal structures for the management of these natural resources by the
government present serious failures, either pre-existing or as a direct result of the
armed conflict.4 Addressing these failures in the governance of natural resources is
therefore an important tool for the prevention of new conflicts. This part of the
analysis assesses the principal rights and obligations of governments in relation to
the management of natural resources, ensuing from treaties and customary
international law. It further examines whether and to what extent the principal
obligations for states ensuing from this assessment are reflected in the constitutive
documents of the KPCS and the OECD Guidance.
For these purposes, the following section briefly sets out the legal framework for
the governance of natural resources within states. Sections 3 and 4 examine the
KPCS and the OECD Guidance respectively. Particular emphasis is placed on the
objectives, means of operation and enforcement of these instruments. Section 5
assesses the contribution of these instruments to stopping the trade in conflict
resources, while Sect. 6 assesses their contribution to improving the governance of
natural resources in states. Section 7 recapitulates the main findings of this article.
4 See e.g. Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2004); and Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (2010).
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2 The Governance of Natural Resources within States
This section assesses the general legal framework for the governance of natural
resources within states and discusses the principal challenges to this framework
arising from situations of armed conflict. The aim of this section is twofold. Firstly,
it aims to provide the theoretical framework for assessing whether the KPCS and the
OECD Guidance contribute to improving the overall governance of natural
resources within states, as discussed in Sect. 6 of this article, by defining the
obligations of states in relation to the governance of their natural resources.
Secondly, this section aims to provide the necessary context for assessing the
contribution of these instruments to stopping the trade in conflict resources, as
discussed in Sect. 5 of this article.
2.1 The General Legal Framework for the Governance of Natural
Resources within States
The governance of natural resources within states is based on the right of states and
peoples to freely exploit their natural resources, without external interference from
other states. Today, this right is firmly established as part of the customary
international law Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
(PSNR),5 and through the related right of peoples to self-determination as enshrined
in identical Article 1(2) of the ICESCR and the ICCPR.
The right of states and peoples to freely exploit their natural resources pursuant to
the principle of PSNR is qualified, notably by international economic, human rights
and environmental law.6 Most relevant for the present purposes are the obligations
for a state to exercise sovereignty over natural resources for the well-being of the
people and to use the natural resources in a sustainable way, taking due care of the
environment. In other words, states are presumed to use their natural resources to
promote sustainable development.
The obligation for states to exploit their natural resources in a sustainable way
seeks to set limits on the way in which states use the natural wealth and resources
situated within their territory and beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, with the
aim of safeguarding their capital for the benefit of present and future generations.
Sustainability is an essential component of natural resource governance, since it
enhances the opportunities for states to promote long-term development by
protecting their resource-base from over-exploitation. The principle of sustainable
use is reflected in several international conventions in the fields of international
environmental and economic law, including the Biological Diversity Convention,
the WTO Agreement, UNCLOS, the International Tropical Timber Agreement and
5 See International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the DR Congo (Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, para. 244. In this judgment, the Court
affirms the customary nature of the principal UN General Assembly Resolutions that incorporate the
Principle of PSNR.
6 See Schrijver (1997).
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CITES.7 In addition, there is a constantly growing body of case law confirming the
relevance of the principle in relation to commercial projects undertaken by states.8
The obligation for states to use natural resources for the well-being of the people
can be derived directly from the 1962 Declaration on PSNR. The very first principle
of this Declaration proclaims that ‘[t]he right of peoples and nations to permanent
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest
of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State
concerned’.9 This obligation has been confirmed inter alia in resolutions adopted by
the UN Security Council in the context of armed conflicts financed by natural
resources10 as well as in several regional conventions.11
The obligation also follows from the designation of peoples as subjects of the
Principle of PSNR and as holders of the right to self-determination, which implies
that peoples can directly assert rights over natural resources. This in turn entails a
corresponding obligation for the government to put in place procedures which allow
peoples to effectively exercise their rights, as confirmed by the Human Rights
Committee in its General Comment relating to Article 1 of the ICCPR.12 Arguably,
this can best be achieved by establishing proper procedures for decision-making,
which allow for the participation of all the parties concerned. Such a right to
participate in government decision-making in relation to the use of natural resources
has been recognised by human rights bodies, including the Human Rights
Committee, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court,
7 See e.g. Art. 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 May 1992, 1760 UNTS 79;
Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, adopted on 15 April 1994, 1867
UNTS 154; Art. 61 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3; Art.
1(m) of the International Tropical Timber Agreement, 27 January 2006; and Art. II of the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243.
8 See e.g. International Court of Justice, Gabcˇı´kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment
of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 7, para. 140; International Court of Justice, Case Concerning
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports 2010,
p. 14, para. 175; International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New
Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Requests for Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 1999,
paras. 70-85; and WTO Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, Report of 12 October 1998, Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R, paras. 129-130.
9 Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UN General Assembly Res. 1803
(XVII) of 14 December 1962.
10 See e.g. Res. 1457 (2003) on the DR Congo in which the Security Council reaffirmed the sovereignty
of the DR Congo over its natural resources and emphasized that these should be exploited ‘transparently,
legally and on a fair commercial basis, to benefit the country and its people’ and Res. 1521 (2003) on
Liberia which stipulates that government revenues from the Liberian timber industry must be used ‘for
legitimate purposes for the benefit of the Liberian people, including development’. [Italics added by the
present author.].
11 See e.g. Art. 21 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which stipulates that the right of
peoples to freely dispose of their natural resources ‘shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the
people’.
12 See General Comment No. 12: The right to self-determination of peoples (Art. 1), adopted by the
Human Rights Committee at its twenty-first session, 13 March 1984, Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, para. 3 and Guidelines for the treaty-specific document to be submitted by States parties
under article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc. CCPR/C/2009/1 of
22 November 2010, under Art. 1.
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in relation to the rights of indigenous peoples. In addition, a broader right to public
participation has been recognised in several instruments in relation to environmental
matters, including in the regional Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,
concluded in Aarhus in 1998 and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity.13
It follows from the Principle of PSNR and the right of peoples to self-
determination that international law requires states to manage their natural resources
in an inclusive and sustainable way. These are the standards against which the
contribution of the mechanisms discussed in Sects. 3 and 4 to improving resource
governance are measured.
2.2 Specific Challenges in Relation to Internal Armed Conflict
By designating states and peoples as subjects of the right to freely exploit natural
resources and to exercise sovereignty over them, international law assumes the
existence of institutions that exercise the right on their behalf. In most cases, states
do indeed have a government that represents the state and its people. In these
circumstances, the government is also the appropriate body to exercise control over
natural resources. Nevertheless, in internal armed conflicts, the authority of the
government is often contested by armed opposition groups. This raises the question
of whether the government is in all cases the appropriate body to exercise the right
to freely exploit natural resources on behalf of the state and its people.14 There may
be circumstances in which the government has lost its legitimacy and thereby its
authority to exercise control over natural resources. The revolution in Libya in 2011
is a relevant example of a situation in which the government lost its legitimacy as a
consequence of its own actions, particularly by launching attacks on its own
population. The ongoing human rights violations committed by the government in
Zimbabwe constitute another relevant example. These situations raise important
concerns in relation to the power vested in the government as the central authority
responsible for the management of the state’s natural resources. These concerns are
also reflected in the definition of ‘conflict diamonds’ pursuant to the KPCS, as
discussed in Sect. 3.
Apart from these fundamental questions with respect to the right of the
government to exercise sovereignty related rights over natural resources, internal
armed conflicts also pose other challenges to the system established by international
law for the governance of natural resources. Governments can simply lose control
over the state’s natural resources as a consequence of armed groups taking over
parts of the territory, including mining sites. It is this situation that the instruments
discussed in the current article primarily aim to address. Both the KPCS and the
OECD Guidance aim to restore the government’s control over the state’s natural
resources, notably by establishing mechanisms to trace the origin of natural
13 See Art. 6 of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 28 June 1998, 2161 UNTS 447 and Art. 14 of the Convention
on Biological Diversity.
14 See on this Dam-de Jong (2015b).
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resources. These mechanisms are discussed in more detail in the following sections
as part of a broader analysis of the nature and functions of the instruments.
3 Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds
The KPCS was developed in response to the armed conflicts raging in Angola and
Sierra Leone, where diamonds were used to finance the military campaigns of rebel
groups opposing the legitimate government.15 Even though the Security Council
had adopted sanctions targeting the export of diamonds originating from these
states, these were undermined by the lack of an effective system in place to track the
origin of diamonds mined in these states.16 The sanctions could therefore easily be
busted by armed groups smuggling the diamonds into neighbouring countries, from
where they were re-exported and sold on the international market.17
The KPCS was set up in order to find an effective international solution to the
problem of diamond smuggling in contravention of UN sanctions. Its aim was to
design a universal certification scheme for rough diamonds that would be applied by
all states producing and purchasing diamonds, thereby closing the trade routes for
armed groups smuggling so-called ‘conflict diamonds’. In order to ensure its
effectiveness, the involvement of all the interested actors, and especially of the
diamond industry, was considered crucial. Therefore, the process was set up as a
partnership between governments, the diamond industry and interested non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). This is one of the most innovative aspects of
the KPCS, which brings together three groups with divergent interests working
together to find a suitable solution for a pressing need.18 In addition, the KPCS was
the first initiative which directly addressed the role of commodities in financing
armed conflict by regulating their trade.
The Kimberley Process was launched in November 2002, only two and a half
years after the first meeting in Kimberley, South Africa.19 The following sub-
sections discuss the objectives, means of operation and enforcement mechanisms of
the KPCS in more detail.
15 See Dam-de Jong (2015a), Chapters 5 and 7 for more details on these conflicts, and Chapter 8 for more
details on the KPCS.
16 See UNSC Res. 1173 (1998) and 1295 (2000) concerning the armed conflict in Angola; Res. 1306
(2000) concerning the armed conflict in Sierra Leone; and Res. 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia’s
involvement in the smuggling of diamonds from Sierra Leone. For a more detailed discussion of these
resolutions, see Dam-de Jong (2015a), Chapter 5. It should be noted that the first meeting leading to the
Kimberley Certification Scheme took place before the Security Council adopted diamond embargoes for
Sierra Leone and Liberia.
17 For more information, see the report of the Panel of Experts on Angola (the Fowler report), UN Doc.
S/2000/203, paras. 75–114; and the report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/1195,
paras. 65–166.
18 For an overview of the negotiating history, see Wright (2012).
19 See the Interlaken Declaration of 5 November 2002 on the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme for Rough Diamonds. The KPCS became fully operational in August 2003. See http://www.
globalpolicy.org/the-dark-side-of-natural-resources-st/diamonds-in-conflict/kimberley-process.html.
Accessed 14 October 2015.
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3.1 Objectives
The KPCS’s primary aim is to protect the legitimate diamonds trade by excluding
‘conflict diamonds’ from it.20 It is premised on the idea that ‘urgent international
action is imperative to prevent the problem of conflict diamonds from negatively
affecting the trade in legitimate diamonds, which makes a critical contribution to the
economies of many of the producing, processing, exporting and importing states,
especially developing states’.21
In order to gain a proper understanding of the KPCS and its objectives, it is
essential to take a closer look at its definition of ‘conflict diamonds’. The Kimberley
Process defines conflict diamonds as:
rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict
aimed at undermining legitimate governments, as described in relevant United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions insofar as they remain in effect,
or in other similar UNSC resolutions which may be adopted in the future, and
as understood and recognized in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
Resolution 55/56, or in other similar UNGA resolutions which may be adopted
in future.22
There are five elements in this definition that merit closer attention. The first is
the reference to ‘rough diamonds’, defined elsewhere as ‘diamonds that are
unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted’.23 The KPCS therefore does not aim to
regulate the diamond trade as such; its objective is limited to eliminating those
diamonds from the market that are most easily obtained and traded by armed
groups. Of course, this considerably narrows the scope of the scheme and provides
loopholes for bypassing it. Since KP certificates are only necessary when the rough
diamonds leave the country, it is possible to polish illegal diamonds locally and to
export them as polished diamonds without a KP certificate.24 This is why major
NGOs, like Global Witness, have pushed for cut and polished diamonds to be
included in the KPCS.25
Secondly, the objective of the KPCS is limited to eliminating the trade in
diamonds that are used by armed groups to finance a conflict. It therefore does not
cover diamonds mined by national authorities, even when the authorities use them
to finance an armed conflict involving gross human rights violations. In addition, it
excludes diamonds that are used to finance human rights violations outside the
context of an armed conflict. These turn out to be very problematic limitations,
20 See KPCS, ninth para. of the preamble.
21 KPCS, fourth para. of the preamble.
22 KPCS, Section I.
23 KPCS, Section I.
24 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Through Trade in
Diamonds’, p. 60.
25 See Global Witness, Making it Work: Why the Kimberley Process Must Do More to Stop Conflict
Diamonds. https://www.globalwitness.org/archive/making-it-work-why-kimberley-process-must-do-
more-stop-conflict-diamonds-0/. Accessed 14 October 2015.
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threatening the very survival of the Kimberley Process. A considerable measure of
controversy has arisen in relation to the decision of the KPCS participants in 2011 to
allow Zimbabwe to resume export of its diamonds,26 while NGOs participating in
KPCS as well as an official KPCS review mission provided clear indications of
human rights abuses committed by the Zimbabwean army at particular mining
sites.27 If the KPCS is to cover these types of situations, its definition of ‘conflict
diamonds’ should be amended. Such an amendment would however also entail a
reconsideration of the KPCS’ objectives. Given the diverse interests of the KPCS
participants, this will not be an easy process.28
The third element that merits closer attention is the reference in the definition to
rebel movements and ‘their allies’, which signals that the KPCS also targets actors
who provide support to rebel movements, either by trading with them or by other
means. This includes foreign states, such as Liberia during the Taylor administra-
tion, which supported the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, as
well as companies.29 The objective of the KPCS is therefore not only to eliminate
the trade in rough diamonds by armed groups directly, but also to address support
given to these armed groups.
Fourthly, the KPCS defines ‘conflict diamonds’ as diamonds that are used to
finance conflicts aimed at undermining legitimate governments. The reference to
‘legitimate’ with respect to governments implies that the term ‘conflict diamonds’
does not include diamonds that are used by rebel movements to finance an armed
conflict for the purpose of overthrowing a government that is not—or no longer—
recognised by the international community. Even though it is not clear whether the
KPCS participants expressly intended to limit the definition of ‘conflict diamonds’
in this way, it is important to realise that this limitation is supported by a textual
interpretation of the KPCS instrument.
The last element of the definition that merits closer attention is related to the role
of the UN Security Council. The KPCS assigns an exclusive role to the Security
Council to determine whether rough diamonds used by armed groups constitute
‘conflict diamonds’ for the purposes of the KPCS. This implies that the exclusive
focus of the KPCS is on eliminating the trade in rough diamonds that have explicitly
been labelled ‘conflict diamonds’ by the Security Council. This is also apparent
from the preamble to the Kimberley Scheme, in which participants state their
26 Final Communique´ from the Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting, 3 November 2011. http://www.
worlddiamondcouncil.com/, resources section, para. 19. Accessed 14 October 2015.
27 See the Final report of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Review Mission to Zimbabwe
from 30 June to 4 July 2009. http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/ZimFinaldraft020909.pdf.
Accessed 14 October 2015. For an overview of KP action in relation to Zimbabwe, see Cullen (2013,
pp. 74–77).
28 An attempt to redefine ‘conflict diamonds’ in order to include human rights abuses in conflict
situations has been made during the US Presidency in 2012, triggered by the Zimbabwe incident, but no
progress has been made since. See the KP Chair Vision Statement of 7 August 2012. http://www.
kimberleyprocess.com/en/system/files/documents/Chair%20Vision%20Statement.pdf. Accessed 14
October 2015.
29 See also Wetzel (2010, pp. 173–174).
The Role of Informal Normative Processes in Improving… 227
123
determination ‘to contribute to and support the implementation of the measures
provided for in [relevant Security Council] resolutions’.30
In conclusion, the KPCS objectives are twofold: to protect the reputation of the
diamond industry by taking away the opportunities for armed groups to obtain
revenues for conflict financing derived from the trade in rough diamonds and to
provide support to sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council in relation to
particular armed conflicts. Its aims should therefore not be overestimated. The
KPCS is not an instrument that aims to address human rights violations associated
with the diamond trade generally nor is it intended to address situations that fall
outside the scope of the UN Security Council’s attention.
3.2 Means of Operation
The KPCS is a certification scheme based on a system of import and export permits
for shipments of rough diamonds. A large discretion is left to the participants
themselves—i.e., countries producing and trading diamonds—in devising and
implementing a certification scheme, as long as they meet certain technical
requirements prescribed by the KPCS. In addition to the focus of the KPCS on
national implementation, it is furthermore important to note that the KPCS does not
impose legally binding obligations upon its participants. It is based on voluntary
commitments undertaken by them. These commitments include the adoption of
appropriate national legislation in addition to setting up a system of internal controls
designed to eliminate conflict diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds
imported into or exported from their territory.31 Interestingly enough, the KPCS also
requires participants to share statistical data concerning the volume of their trade in
rough diamonds with other participants.32 Subsequent administrative decisions have
built on this standard, formulating more specific reporting requirements.33
Furthermore, participants should provide to other participants up-to-date informa-
tion on their relevant laws, regulations, rules, procedures and practices.34
Implementation of these minimum standards is a prerequisite for participation in
the KPCS. Additional non-mandatory requirements relevant for the governance of
diamonds include furthermore the licensing of mines and tracking cash purchases of
rough diamonds through official banking channels.
Decision-making within the KPCS is done by the Plenary, which meets once a
year. The Plenary consists of the participating states, representatives from the
diamond industry and NGOs. Even though the diamond industry and NGOs
participate in the Plenary and have been granted the right to intervene and to submit
proposals and amendments, decision-making is reserved to the participating states,
30 KPCS, preamble, para. 5.
31 KPCS, Section IV(a).
32 KPCS, Section V and Annex III.
33 See the 2003 Administrative Decision on Statistical Reporting, which sets out that participants are to
submit these data four times a year to the Working Group on Statistics and that a failure to do so will be
reported to the Chair.
34 KPCS, Section V(a).
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which decide on the basis of consensus.35 This system of consensus decision-
making has been heralded by some as an important means to secure the necessary
support for subsequent implementation of KP decisions and criticised by others for
its effects on decision-making in general, where a single participant is able to block
decisions, including on suspension of non-compliant states.36 The KPCS further-
more does not contain direct obligations for the diamond industry. It is paralleled by
a system of self-regulation for the diamond industry under the auspices of the World
Diamond Council.37
3.3 Enforcement
Notwithstanding the fact that the KPCS is not legally binding, participation in the
process is dependent on participants’ implementation of minimum standards
formulated by the KPCS. These are aimed at ensuring a sufficient quality and
compatibility of national systems of internal controls.38 If states do not meet these
minimum standards, they can be suspended from the Process.39 Suspension is a
matter that should not be taken too lightly, since participants in the KPCS,
accounting for 99.8 % of the worldwide production in rough diamonds and
including all the major diamond trading countries, are not allowed to trade
diamonds with non-participants or with participants that fail to satisfy the scheme’s
basic requirements.40 There have been several cases in which states were
temporarily suspended from the KPCS, the most recent being the Central African
Republic after the 2013 coup d’e´tat.41
35 See KPCS, Section VI(5) and the 2003 KP Administrative Decision Rules of Procedure of meetings of
the plenary and its AD HOC Working Groups and Subsidiary bodies (Johannesburg) for more specific
rules regarding decision-making (Rule 42) and on participation of observers (Rule 45).
36 See generally on consensus decision-making and how it operates within the KPCS, Grant (2013). It
should however be noted that the author does not properly distinguish between participants (which have a
formalized role in decision-making) and observers (which do not have a formal role in decision-making).
37 The World Diamond Council has been established in 2000 with the purpose of ‘represent[ing] the
diamond industry in the development and implementation of regulatory and voluntary systems to control
the trade in diamonds embargoed by the United Nations or covered by the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme’. See http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.com for more details.
38 These minimum requirements include the following commitments: to establish a system of internal
controls designed to eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds
imported into and exported from its territory; to designate an Importing and an Exporting Authority(ies);
to ensure that rough diamonds are imported and exported in tamper resistant containers; as required,
amend or enact appropriate laws or regulations to implement and enforce the Certification Scheme and to
maintain dissuasive and proportional penalties for transgressions; and to collect and maintain relevant
official production, import and export data, and collate and exchange such data with other participants and
the KPCS. See KPCS, Section IV(a).
39 Guidelines for the Participation Committee in Recommending Interim Measures as regards Serious
Non-compliance with KPCS Minimum Requirements, adopted on 5 November 2008. www.
kimberleyprocess.com. Accessed 14 October 2015.
40 See http://www.kimberleyprocess.com, ‘About’ section.
41 See http://www.kimberleyprocess.com. Other cases of suspension include the Republic of the Congo
in 2004 and Venezuela in 2008. The latter was a case of self-suspension. See Grant (2012), p. 165 for
more information.
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The KPCS has introduced a peer-review system in order to monitor compliance
by participating states of the minimum standards. Review visits are regularly sent to
the participating states, consisting of representatives of other participating states, the
diamond industry and NGOs. In cases of suspicion of non-compliance with the
KPCS standards, the Plenary can further decide to conduct a review mission. Even
though participants formally have to consent to the carrying out of such a mission,42
this is primarily in their own interest since it enables them to demonstrate
compliance with the requirements of the scheme and thereby to prevent suspension.
For the success of the KPCS in general the peer-review is an important asset, since it
functions both as an early-warning system and as a means to determine non-
compliance. In both situations, follow-up action can be taken, including a request to
the respective government to formulate an action plan to ensure compliance.
Notwithstanding the existence of these internal enforcement mechanisms, one of
the most important enforcement mechanisms of the KPCS is perhaps situated
outside the initiative itself. As indicated at the beginning of this section, the UN
Security Council has regularly imposed sanctions against states where diamonds
financed the armed conflict, referring to implementation of a reliable Certificate of
Origin system as a means for the government to resume diamond exports. In
Liberia, for example, the Security Council demanded that the government led by
Charles Taylor ‘cease all direct or indirect import of Sierra Leone rough diamonds
which are not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of the Government
of Sierra Leone’ and called upon the government ‘to establish an effective
Certificate of Origin regime for trade in rough diamonds that is transparent and
internationally verifiable’.43 In later resolutions, the Council explicitly referred to
implementation of the KPCS as a means to expedite the lifting of the sanctions for
diamonds traded by the government.44 It is therefore clear that the KPCS and the
sanctions reinforce each other. Whereas the KPCS was first developed to assist in
the implementation of these sanctions, these same sanctions assist in enforcing the
KPCS in specific instances.
4 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains
of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas
The Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas was developed by the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to address the responsibility of
corporations in respect of the trade in conflict minerals. The Guidance was adopted
in 2011, covering the three categories of minerals that are mostly associated with
armed conflict. These are tin, tantalum and tungsten, including their ores or mineral
42 See the 2003 Administrative Decision on the Implementation of Peer Review in the KPCS. http://
www.kimberleyprocess.com, documents section. Accessed 17 April 2015. The peer review system has
been revised several times, the last revision dates from 2012.
43 UN Security Council Res. 1343 (2001), operative paras. 2(c) and 15.
44 See e.g. UN Security Council Res. 2045 (2012) on Coˆte d’Ivoire.
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derivatives.45 The Guidance was subsequently amended in 2012 to cover gold
sources.
The Guidance is embedded in a broader framework of instruments adopted by the
OECD in the field of International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. Most
importantly, the Guidance is an implementation tool for the supply chain due
diligence requirements set out in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises. The 2011 revised Guidelines contain recommendations on responsible
business conduct for multinational companies, including recommendations on
supply chain due diligence for the purpose of helping companies ‘to identify,
prevent and mitigate actual and potential adverse impacts […] and account for how
these impacts are addressed’.46 The Due Diligence Guidance aims to provide
companies sourcing minerals from states struggling with armed conflicts or
insecurity the means to carry out a supply chain due diligence assessment as
recommended by the Guidelines. The following sub-sections discuss the objectives,
means of operation and enforcement mechanisms of the OECD Guidance in more
detail.
4.1 Objectives
The OECD Guidance aims to ensure that companies procuring minerals from
conflict-affected and high-risk areas ‘respect human rights, avoid contributing to
conflict and successfully contribute to sustainable, equitable and effective devel-
opment’.47 Notwithstanding these rather lofty goals, the Guidance is first and
foremost a practical instrument, designed to help companies to set up procedures to
assess the risks of their activities contributing to armed conflict or human rights
abuses and to find adequate responses to eliminate these risks.
The Guidance addresses several types of risks. First of all, it aims to prevent
companies sourcing from, or operating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas from
complicity to serious abuses associated with the extraction, transport or trade in
minerals. The Guidance outlines the following forms of serious abuses: any forms of
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, any forms of forced or compulsory
labour, the worst forms of child labour, other gross human rights violations and
abuses such as widespread sexual violence, and war crimes or other serious
violations of international humanitarian law, crimes against humanity or genocide.48
In other words, the Guidance aims to ensure that neither companies engaged in the
minerals sector in fragile states or their business partners are in any way involved in
the violation of fundamental human rights or the commission of international
crimes.
45 Recommendation of the OECD Council on Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of
Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, adopted on 25 May 2011 (amended on 17 July
2012), Doc. C(2012)93.
46 OECD (2011), Chapter II, para. A 10.
47 Ibid., especially para. 1.
48 OECD (2011), Annex II.
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Secondly, the OECD Guidance seeks to prevent companies from providing
support—either direct or indirect—to non-state armed groups or public or private
security forces that illegally control mining sites or transportation routes. In other
words, it seeks to prevent the trade in conflict minerals, understood rather broadly as
minerals exploited by armed militias, either by private armed bands or by
contingents of the national army. It is here that the objectives of the OECD
Guidance coincide with those of the KPCS.
Finally, the Guidance aims to prevent companies from engaging in bribery or
fraudulent misrepresentation of the origin of minerals. The Guidance requires
companies to support efforts to eliminate money laundering and to ensure that all
taxes, fees and royalties related to mineral extraction, trade and export are paid to
the government and disclosed in accordance with the principles of the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a voluntary instrument that requires
governments to report on revenues obtained from concessions and companies to
report on their payments to governments.49 In this way, the OECD Guidance seeks
to prevent illegal taxation in all its forms by non-state armed groups and criminal
bands in conflict-affected and high-risk areas. In addition, it aims to combat
government corruption.
It can be concluded from the above that the objectives of the OECD Guidance are
broad, in the sense that the Guidance encompasses issues that are not directly related
to the problem of conflict financing. It also seeks to address the wider responsibility
of mineral companies and their policies on society in conflict-affected and high-risk
areas, in particular with the provisions on serious abuses and bribery. This does not
imply that the OECD Guidance is an instrument designed for the promotion of
responsible business practices generally. It clearly sets a very high standard with
regard to abuses in the minerals sector that are not directly related to the issue of
providing support to armed groups. By addressing only violations of fundamental
human rights and the commission of international crimes, the relevance of the
Guidance is limited to addressing only the most serious irregularities in the
extractive sector.
4.2 Means of Operation
The OECD Guidance seeks to realise its objectives by establishing a framework for
corporate due diligence, defined as ‘an on-going, proactive and reactive process
through which companies can ensure that they respect human rights and do not
contribute to conflict’.50 This process operates on the basis of a five-step approach to
due diligence. The basic components of this approach are the establishment of
strong company management systems, the identification and assessment of supply
chain risks, the design and implementation of strategies to respond to identified
49 For more details on the EITI Initiative, see the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, The EITI
Standard, EITI International Secretariat (May 2013). http://eiti.org. Accessed 14 October 2015. See also
Dam-de Jong (2015a), Chapter 8.
50 OECD (2013), p. 13.
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risks, the performance of independent third-party audits, and annual reporting on
supply chain due diligence.
The Guidance therefore requires companies first of all to implement internal
policies aimed at introducing transparency in the minerals supply chain. The
Guidance requires downstream companies, referring to the supply chain from
smelters/refiners to retailers, to obtain information from their suppliers about the
origin of the minerals purchased by them, while upstream companies, referring to
the supply chain from the mine to smelters/refiners, should provide such information
to their business partners. In addition, the Guidance builds in safeguards, including
independent audits in order to ensure the credibility of the information relied on by
downstream companies, as well as the information provided to them by upstream
companies.
The OECD Guidance further contains two supplements which provide specific
guidance to companies on how to implement the five steps referred to above in their
particular sectors. One supplement focuses on supply chain due diligence for
companies trading in tin, tantalum and tungsten, while the other focuses on gold.
Without entering into technicalities, it is important to note that the Guidance
requires companies to suspend or discontinue their contracts with their suppliers
once they identify a particular risk.51
4.3 Enforcement
As an implementing tool for the due diligence requirements set out in the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the Guidance can benefit from the
institutional structure established for theseGuidelines, including its dispute settlement
mechanism. Pursuant to theOECDGuidelines, states are to set up a systemof so-called
National Contact Points (NCPs). One of the principal aims of theseNCPs is to increase
the effectiveness of the Guidelines by resolving issues that arise in relation to their
implementation.52 These issues can be raised by all the interested parties, including
worker organizations and non-governmental organizations, resulting in a decision by
the NCP onwhether the company complained of has complied with its responsibilities
under the Guidelines.53 Even though the NCPs cannot take binding decisions and their
principal task is to mediate in disputes rather than to settle them, the dispute resolution
mechanism has proven to be a valuable resource for non-governmental organizations
challenging the human rights policies of individual companies.
Most of the cases regarding due diligence in the extractives sector NCPs have
dealt with involve corporate violations outside situations of armed conflict.54 Cases
dealing specifically with conflict minerals predate the adoption of the Guidance and
51 OECD (2013), Annex 2, paras. 2, 4, 10 and 14.
52 OECD (2011), p. 68, Section I(1).
53 OECD (2011), p. 72, Section C.
54 See e.g. Final Statement by the Canadian National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises: Canada Tibet Committee v. China Gold International Resources, 1 April 2015;
Final Statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises: IAC & WDM vs. GCM Resources, 20 November 2014.
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the 2011 revision of the Guidelines. Most of these were unsuccessful,55 with one
notable exception. This concerns the complaint brought before the British NCP by
the NGO Global Witness against Afrimex, a British mineral trading company
operating in the DR Congo. The complaint accused Afrimex of paying taxes to rebel
forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and of practising insufficient
due diligence in the supply chain, sourcing minerals from mines that use child and
forced labour.56 Even though this complaint also predates the adoption of the
Guidance and the 2011 revision of the Guidelines,57 the UK National Contact Point
applied the Guidelines very progressively, taking into account new developments in
corporate responsibility for human rights abuses emanating from the ‘Protect,
Respect and Remedy Framework’ developed by John Ruggie, Special Represen-
tative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises.58 The NCP concluded that Afrimex
failed to fulfil the due diligence requirements, because (1) it relied exclusively on
statements by its suppliers on the origin of the minerals purchased and (2) it ‘did not
take steps to influence the supply chain and to explore options with its suppliers
exploring methods to ascertain how minerals could be sourced from mines that do
not use child or forced labour or with better health and safety’.59 It is clear from the
statement issued by the British NCP that supply chain due diligence requires
companies to actively monitor the supply chain and to search for ways to improve
conditions in the supply chain.
The Afrimex case is important from the point of view of standard-setting. Yet, it
also signals the shortcomings of the OECD framework in terms of enforcement. In
this particular case, Afrimex’ statements that it had stopped trading in minerals from
the DRC after September 2008 were sufficient for the NCP to end its inquiries.60
The possibilities for NCPs to ‘enforce’ their recommendations largely depend on
55 These cases were brought by NGOs to several NCPs, following a 2002 report by the UN Panel of
Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC, naming
several companies considered to be violating the OECD Guidelines. In most of these cases, the NCP
either argued that the claims were not sufficiently substantiated or concluded that the UN Panel had
resolved the case and that there was therefore no need for the NCP to reopen it. The UN Panel of Experts
has indeed been engaged in dialogue with the companies named by them and referred some situations
directly to the relevant NCPs for follow-up and monitoring. See the Final report of the Panel of Experts
on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2002/1146, 16 October 2002; and Final report of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, UN Doc. S/2003/1027, 23 October 2003.
56 See Final Statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises: Afrimex (UK) LTD, Summary of NCP Decision, 28 August 2008.
57 It is important to note that the previous version of the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
contained a rudimentary provision on supply chain due diligence, stating merely that ‘[e]nterprises should
encourage, where practicable, business partners, including suppliers and sub-contractors, to apply
principles of corporate conduct compatible with the Guidelines’. See OECD (2000), Chapter II, para.
II.10.
58 See http://business-humanrights.org/. Accessed 14 October 2015.
59 Final Statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises: Afrimex (UK) LTD, Summary of NCP Decision, 28 August 2008, paras. 51 and 62.
60 See http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_114. Accessed 14 October 2015.
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national legislation. The Canadian NCP, for example, has been given discretion to
apply sanctions to companies that do not cooperate in the dispute settlement
procedure. Under the 2014 Enhanced Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy to
Strengthen Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad, companies that do not participate in
a procedure before the NCP face withdrawal of advocacy support abroad by the
Canadian government.61 In April 2015, the Canadian NCP applied these sanctions
for the first time in a case involving a gold mine in Tibet.62 For the credibility of the
NCP system, it would be wise for other states to follow this example. Even though
the OECD Guidelines and related instruments are voluntary, OECD member states
have stated their commitment to promote the guidelines. This implies that they
should at least refrain from providing active economic diplomacy services to
companies that clearly act in violation of the guidelines.
In addition to the NCPs as internal enforcement mechanisms, reference can also be
made to enforcement mechanisms that are situated outside the OECD framework. A
first suchmechanism is theUNSecurity Council, which endorsed theOECDGuidance
as a means of appraising corporate due diligence for the purposes of stopping the trade
in conflict minerals from the DR Congo.63 In addition to its general endorsement, the
Security Council took an important step by mandating the DR Congo Sanctions
Committee to take the exercise of due diligence by a company into account when
deciding to place it on the sanctions list. In other words, companies operating in or
sourcing from theDRCongo risk to be subjected toUN sanctions when not adhering to
the approach set out in the OECD Guidance. Even though its effect is restricted to the
DR Congo, this is a strong enforcement mechanism.
National legislation giving effect to the Due Diligence Guidance can be regarded
as a second external enforcement mechanism. Section 1502 of the Dodd Frank Act
requires companies listed on Wall street to determine whether their products contain
minerals originating in the DR Congo or neighbouring countries and to report this to
the Securities and Exchange Commission.64 Even though this is merely a reporting
obligation and, again, restricted to the DR Congo and surrounding countries, it does
require companies to exercise some basic form of due diligence. It is therefore an
important tool in enhancing due diligence efforts for the mining industry.65 Other
61 Canada’s Enhanced Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy to Strengthen Canada’s Extractive
Sector Abroad, 14 November 2014, pp. 12–13, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements.
62 Final Statement by the Canadian National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises: Canada Tibet Committee v. China Gold International Resources, 1 April 2015.
63 See UN Security Council Res. 1952 (2010), in which the SC referred to a set of guidelines developed
by its Group of Experts on the DR Congo in collaboration with the OECD and to ‘equivalent guidelines’,
thereby implicitly referring to the OECD Guidance.
64 Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, adopted on 21 July 2010.
65 It is relevant to note here that the US Dodd Frank Act has been criticized in the media for establishing
a ‘de facto embargo’ on minerals from the Great Lakes Region. While it is true that an unintended by-
effect of the adoption of the Dodd Frank Act is that a number of companies have taken away their
business from the DR Congo, it is also true that the Act, as part of a broader international legal and
political framework, has been an important driver for reforms in the DR Congo’s mining sector. The
different due diligence initiatives have supported the efforts of the government of the DR Congo and
neighbouring countries to set up systems for the bagging and tagging of minerals and for the certification
of conflict-free mines. See on this the Final Report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with
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important home states of companies active in the extractive sector are likewise
developing legislation to give effect to the OECD Guidance. These include the
European Union and—non-OECD member—China.66 These developments provide
further leverage to improving human rights due diligence by companies.
5 Contribution of the Initiatives to Stopping the Trade in Conflict
Resources
The KPCS and the OECD Guidance are both instruments that have been developed
to stop the trade in conflict resources. Eliminating the trade in natural resources
exploited by armed groups is the sole purpose of the KPCS, while it ranks among
the principal objectives of the OECD Guidance. Both instruments aim to realise this
objective by introducing tracking and tracing systems that permit to identify the
source of the minerals. In other words, both instruments opt for increasing
transparency in the trade in natural resources as the principal means to stop trade in
conflict resources.
Even though the objectives (increasing transparency) and principal approach
(tracking the origin of particular natural resources) of these instruments largely
coincide, their nature as well as their methods differ from each other. The KPCS is a
certification scheme to be implemented primarily by the participating states and
operating on the basis of a system of import and export permits. In contrast, the
OECD Guidance is a risk management tool to be implemented by companies,
requiring them to integrate due diligence processes into their management plans.
Where the KPCS therefore primarily addresses states, requiring them to put in place
a system of internal and external controls, the OECD Guidance primarily addresses
companies, requiring them to put in place control systems in their corporate
management plans.
A further difference relates to the methods used by the instruments to establish
the origin of particular natural resources. The KPCS has developed tools to identify
the origin of diamonds based on their specific characteristics. In cases of doubt
regarding the origin of imported diamonds, their origin can therefore be established
on the basis of a technical assessment relating to the characteristics of the diamonds
themselves. This system strengthens the other mechanisms of the process, relating
to internal controls and import and export permits. No such system exists yet for the
Footnote 65 continued
paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2136 (2014), UN Doc. S/2015/19, 12 January 2015, paras.
156–159. Even though there are still many obstacles to overcome, it is important not to give a negative
value judgment of the due diligence initiatives too early, based on problems encountered in the first
implementation phase.
66 Draft Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council setting up a Union system for supply
chain due diligence self-certification of responsible importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and
gold originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas, COM (2014) 111 final, 5 March 2014; and China
Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC), Chinese
Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains. For more information on the Chinese
initiative. http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/CCCMC-Guidelines-Project%20Brief%20-%20EN.pdf.
Accessed 14 October 2015.
236 D. A. Dam-de Jong
123
minerals covered by the OECD Guidance.67 The Guidance therefore has to rely
solely on the accuracy of supply chain due diligence, i.e. a documentary trail
provided by companies throughout the supply chain allowing to trace the origin of
the minerals, backed up by independent audits.68
There are however also striking similarities between the two instruments. First of
all, it is important to note that even though the two instruments have been developed
through partnerships between states, companies and NGOs, they are largely state
centred. The KPCS relies principally on implementation of the requirements by
‘participants’, i.e. diamond producing and consuming states. In addition, decisions
within the scheme are also taken by participants, while the diamond industry and
NGOs have observer status. The OECD Guidance, even while it is designed for
implementation by companies directly, also relies to a large extent on states to
promote the Guidance. Upon its approval, the OECD Council recommended that
members and non-members adherent to the Declaration on Investment and
Multilateral Enterprises ‘actively promote the observance of the Guidance by
companies’, that they ‘take measures to actively support the integration into
corporate management systems’ of the framework, and that they ‘ensure the widest
possible dissemination of the Guidance and its active use by other stakeholders
including professional associations, financial institutions, and civil society organi-
zations’.69 This can be interpreted as a call upon OECD member states to adopt
relevant national legislation and/or to provide their companies with the necessary
direction to implement the requirements formulated by the Guidance. The reporting
obligation for companies operating in or sourcing minerals from the DR Congo, as
formulated in Section 1502 of the US Dodd Frank Act, is one of the most far-
reaching examples of how this recommendation could be implemented.
In addition, it is important to emphasise that both instruments are voluntary in
nature and rely on commitments entered into by the participants. This is clear from
the basic documents relating to the initiatives, which both formulate recommen-
dations on measures that participants should take. This voluntary approach does not
necessarily affect their effectiveness, since these instruments also contain mech-
anisms, both internal and external, to ensure adherence to their principles. These
include peer review and suspension from the process (internal) and the imposition of
sanctions by the UN Security Council (external) for the KPCS as well as the system
of NCPs (internal) and Security Council sanctions (external) for the OECD
Guidance. Furthermore, both initiatives are backed up by national legislation. For
67 In 2014, the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region adopted a Regional Certification
Mechanism that should perform these functions, but this mechanism has been developed for the Great
Lakes region only.
68 The OECD and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) have developed
more refined supporting mechanisms for the Great Lakes Region, including a system of ‘bagging and
tagging’, meaning that the minerals are checked when they leave the mine and transported in closed bags
to refineries. See the OECD and ICGLR report ‘Due Diligence Guidance: towards conflict-free mineral
supply chains’, a simplified guide for companies. http://www.oecd.com. See also the ICGLR certification
manual, adopted in September 2014. http://www.icglr.org.
69 See the Recommendation of the OECD Council on Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, adopted on 25 May 2011 (amended on
17 July 2012), Doc. C(2012)93, especially paras. 1–3.
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the KPCS, this is primarily the legislation that participants adopt in order to
implement the minimum standards of the scheme. For the OECD Guidance,
initiatives like the US Dodd Frank Act as well as the legislation that is currently
developed in the EU and China provide important incentives to companies to
implement the OECD Guidance.
Both instruments therefore have mechanisms to achieve their purposes. The
question that remains is whether these instruments are actually successful in
stopping the trade in conflict resources. For the OECD Guidance, this is difficult to
assess since there are no empirical data available yet. For the KPCS it is estimated
that the trade in conflict diamonds has been reduced to approximately 1 % of total
diamond sales.70 Smuggling practices and fraud are major vulnerabilities for both
instruments.71 This is especially so for the KPCS, since this system relies entirely on
certificates issued by national authorities, with peer-review as the only guarantee
against misconduct. The independent audit introduced by the OECD Guidance
should provide guarantees to prevent fraud, but there the difficulty is that it is
problematic to establish the exact origin of the minerals. In order to be truly
effective, it should therefore be backed up by a certification system for minerals.
Such a system has been developed for the African Great Lakes region, but it would
be necessary to expand this initiative to other conflict-affected and high-risk areas.
6 Contribution of the Initiatives to Improving Natural Resources
Governance in War-Torn States
The KPCS and the OECD Guidance were originally developed against the backdrop
of resource-related armed conflicts, which explains their emphasis on establishing
mechanisms to prevent armed groups from trading in natural resources. However, in
order to effectively stop natural resources from financing armed conflicts, it is also
essential to improve the overall governance of natural resources within states. In
many of the armed conflicts financed by natural resources, inadequate structures for
the management of natural resources provided armed groups the opportunity to gain
control over natural resources.72 In addition, grievances over the management of
natural resources are often among the root causes of these conflicts.73 These
grievances may relate to the effects of natural resources exploitation on the living
environment of communities or to the misdistribution of the profits obtained from
natural resources exploitation.74
The current section aims to assess the substantive contribution of the KPCS and the
OECD Guidance to improving the governance of natural resources in conflict-affected
70 See http://www.diamondfacts.org.
71 See e.g. http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/enforcement for the KPCS; and Final report of the
Group of Experts on the DR Congo submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council
resolution 2136 (2014), paras. 156–215 for due diligence in the Great Lakes Region.
72 Ross (2004a).
73 Ross (2004b), p. 41.
74 Ibid.
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states. A first issue of concern in this respect is the extent to which the instruments
actually addressmalpractices by the domestic government. It is relevant to note here that
the scope of the instruments differs in important respects. Both instruments aim to
eliminate the trade in particular natural resources that contribute to financing or fuelling
armedconflicts.Theoverall purpose of theKPCS is limited in this respect to stopping the
trade in diamonds by armed groups and their allies. In other words, the KPCS does not
cover the trade in diamonds by abusive governments. In contrast, the stated objective of
the OECDGuidance is much broader. It includes the elimination of the trade in natural
resources that contribute to financing or fuelling armed conflicts, while it also seeks to
reduce the contribution of the covered minerals to severe human rights abuses and the
commission of international crimes, without specifying the source of the violations. In
other words, the OECD Guidance would cover incidents like the one in Zimbabwe,
where government security forces committed severe human rights violations in order to
secure the diamond mines, an incident that has seriously reduced the credibility of the
KPCS. From this perspective, the OECD Guidance’s contribution to improving the
governance of natural resources within states is potentially greater. It does not only
address the challenges posed by armed groups undermining the government’s position,
but also abuses committed by the government itself.
In addition, it is relevant to assess the contribution of the instruments to
promoting sustainable and inclusive management of natural resources in light of the
legal framework set out in Sect. 2 of this article. As regards sustainability, the
answer can be very short. Neither of the instruments contains measures aimed at
protecting the environment. This is largely due to their limited objectives, i.e.
stopping the trade in conflict diamonds for the KPCS and preventing companies
from violating human rights and contributing to armed conflicts for the OECD
Guidance. However, from the perspective of addressing grievances related to
environmental pollution and degradation, it is a missed opportunity.
The question of whether these instruments promote inclusive natural resources
management can best be assessed by looking at the methods employed by the KPCS
and the OECD Guidance to enhance external transparency for citizens.75 For the
OECD Guidance these include a requirement for companies to ensure that all taxes,
fees and royalties are paid to the government and that they are disclosed in
accordance with the principles formulated by the Extractive Industry Transparency
Initiative (EITI), a voluntary instrument that aims to eliminate corruption in the
extractive sectors. In addition, the OECD Guidance requires companies to submit
their administration to an independent audit and to publish their due diligence policy
as part of their annual report. The KPCS does not contain such requirements, but it
does require participating states to report on the volume of their diamond trade.
Indirectly, this requirement permits the general public to obtain knowledge of
government revenues from the diamond industry. Arguably, data on the volume of
trade in the natural resources covered by these instruments may help to start national
processes aimed at increasing accountability for governments. Furthermore, the
75 A distinction can be made between external transparency (towards external actors) and internal
transparency (towards those actors that are actively engaged in the initiative). For a useful categorisation
of transparency, see OECD (2012).
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active participation of NGOs in the process ensures a degree of public scrutiny, not
in the least because these NGOs directly inform the general public of irregularities
in the process. Both instruments therefore contribute in their own way to promoting
inclusive natural resources management. They do this notably by providing
information to citizens, which may ultimately enhance accountability. Although
modest, this in itself is a useful contribution to improving the governance of natural
resources within states.
7 Concluding Remarks
This article set out to answer two questions: which mechanisms do the KPCS and
the OECD Guidance establish to stop the trade in conflict resources; and to what
extent do they contribute to improving the governance of natural resources as a tool
for the prevention of new conflicts? In relation to the first question, it is important to
emphasise that this article does not consider these instruments as the solution to all
problems related to conflict resources. Clearly they are not. The objectives of both
instruments are limited and their implementation is fraught with difficulties.
Nevertheless, the purpose of this article was principally to focus on their merits and
to examine what these instruments can do.
This article demonstrated that both instruments establish mechanisms allowing to
trace the origin of minerals. Whereas the KPCS relies principally on certificates
issued by state authorities for exported diamonds, the OECD Guidance relies on a
documentary trail provided by companies throughout the supply chain. This article
further argued that, even though the KPCS and the OECD Guidance do not impose
legally binding obligations upon their participants, there are both internal and
external possibilities to enforce these instruments, implying that they are strongly
embedded in a broader legal and policy framework.
It is furthermore relevant to note that both instruments aim to enhance transparency
in the supply chain. Whereas the KPCS focuses only on the first part of the supply
chain, i.e. the trade in rough diamonds, the OECD Guidance covers the whole supply
chain, from mines to consumer products. Both instruments contain measures that
contribute to improving public administration of the proceeds of natural resources,
notably by increasing transparency in payments. In thisway, the instruments indirectly
contribute to improving the governance of natural resources in conflict regions and
reflect a growing consensus on how these natural resources should bemanaged, at least
for the purposes of conflict resolution. In this way, the KPCS and the OECDGuidance
can be regarded as part of broader developments both in international law and politics
towards more transparent and inclusive natural resources management.
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